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Why do we feel bad—angry, anxious, afraid, what have you? Are negative emotions like these ever 
valuable? Does feeling bad ever do good? Among both philosophers and folk, a common response is 
no: negative emotions are things it would be better not to experience. For instance, the Stoic 
philosopher Seneca maintains that anger “changes all things from the best and justest condition in to 
the opposite” (1995, 18). Immanuel Kant helps flesh out this worry. As he sees it, in order for an 
individual to be virtuous, he must “bring all his capacities and inclinations under his (reason’s) control” 
(1996, 536). In this respect, emotions—especially negative emotions—are problematic insofar as they 
make reflection “impossible or more difficult” (535); the “true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind”—
for it “is the state of health in the moral life…” (536, original emphasis). The picture that emerges from 
all this is not flattering: negative emotions lack value because they are pernicious, inherently 
unpleasant, and inconsistent with human virtue. 
I reject this skepticism. As a slogan: negative emotions matter. Not only can they help us 
manage risks, dangers, and threats, they are also central elements of what a good or virtuous character 
consists in. Negative emotions, that is, have both instrumental and aretaic value. To draw this out, I 
take anxiety as a case study. I show that, contrary to much folk and philosophical wisdom, anxiety can 
be a very valuable—both for our ability to successfully navigate the complexities of social life and as 
a central dimension of being virtuous. Along the way, we will also draw some conclusions about the 
value of other negative emotions—particularly, anger and fear.  
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1. A Primer on Emotion and Anxiety 
For the discussion that follows, it will be helpful for me to say a little about how I’m understanding 
emotion in general and anxiety in particular. Speaking at a high level, emotions are responses to 
perceived threats and opportunities. And so to experience a given emotion is to respond to a particular 
threat/opportunity with a distinctive combination of feelings, thoughts, and actions. To see this, 
consider some familiar emotions.  
Joy: A response to progress or success that tends to bring associated thoughts (‘I’ve done 
well,’ ‘That was nice’), positively valenced feelings, and a motivational tendency to affirm 
one’s efforts or stay the course. 
 
Fear: A response to imminent threats or dangers that tends to bring associated thoughts (‘Oh 
no!’), negatively valenced feelings, and a motivational tendency to avoid or escape the 
threat/danger at hand. 
 
Anger: A response to affronts or slights from others that tends to bring associated thoughts 
(‘How dare you!,’ ‘That’s out of line’), negatively valenced feelings, and a motivational 
tendency to defend oneself or one’s interests.1 
 
Understanding emotions in this way draws out that they function as distinctive forms of evaluative 
awareness. To fear the dog is to see the dog as dangerous—as something to be avoided; to be a happy 
about the talk you just gave is to see the talk as a success—as a commendable performance.  
Moreover, if emotions are evaluative responses of this sort, then they have accuracy 
conditions—they are things that can be (un)fitting in virtue of (mis)representing the evaluative 
content of their targets. Consider: it’s fitting to fear the dog when the dog really is dangerous, and it’s 
fitting to be happy about your presentation when the presentation actually was a success. Recognizing 
that emotions can be (un)fitting is significant for two reasons. First, it reveals that when we are 
considering whether a particular emotion has value, we are (typically) asking whether fitting instances 
of that emotion are valuable. That is, we’re interested in questions like whether it’s helpful to fear 
                                                 
1 These sketches are not intended as a substantive account of what emotions are—that’s a thorny issue that I don’t want 
(or need) to take a stand on. Rather, my aim is to give an intuitive picture of how I’m thinking about emotions. 
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the (vicious, snarling) dog when the dog is, in fact, dangerous. Second, just because an emotion is 
fitting in this (technical) sense doesn’t automatically mean that it’s useful: your fear of the dog, 
though fitting, may nonetheless provoke it to attack. 
With this background in hand, we can turn to anxiety. Anxiety is a response to uncertainty 
about a possible threat or challenge.2 More specifically, when one feels anxious, one sees one’s 
situation as involving a threat or challenge whose potential is unpredictable, uncontrollable, or 
otherwise open to question. Anxiety of this sort typically brings thoughts about one’s predicament 
(‘I’m worried,’ ‘What should I do?’), negatively valenced feelings of unease and concern, and a 
motivational tendency to be cautious toward the uncertain threat or challenge one faces. Moreover, 
how one responds will turn on one’s perception of the difficulty at hand. For instance, if one sees 
one’s situation as involving a potential physical harm (e.g., the large man approaching in the dark 
parking lot) or social threat (e.g., criticism from peers about one’s debate performance), one will 
tend to respond defensively—avoidance, withdrawal, appeasement, and other risk minimization 
efforts. By contrast, if one’s anxiety results from uncertainty about the correctness of one’s beliefs or 
choices (e.g., a decision about what to do in a novel situation; concerns about how best to respond 
to a difficult objection to one’s views), one will tend more toward epistemic behaviors—reflection, 
investigation, deliberation, and the like. This suggests anxiety has (at least) two dimensions: a 
defensive response that’s directed toward protecting oneself against physical or social threats, and a 
more epistemically-oriented response that’s concerned with (good or accurate) decision making 
(Kurth 2016). With this initial picture of emotion and anxiety in hand, we can turn to the central 
project: determining whether a negative emotion like anxiety is valuable, and if so, in what way. 
                                                 
2 The term ‘anxiety’ as used in ordinary speech, philosophy, and psychology refers to a range of phenomena that are 
unlikely to have a common core. So here I focus on an important dimension of what we refer to as ‘anxiety’—namely, 
an emotion that concerns uncertainty about what to do in the face of a potential threat/challenge. 
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2. Is Anxiety Instrumentally Valuable? 
As we noted, when asking about the instrumental value of an emotion, we’re typically asking whether 
fitting instances of that emotion are useful. On this front, the quotes from the introduction suggest 
that negative emotions are unhelpful because they interfere with judgment and action. This worry can 
be fleshed out in a couple of ways. First, there’s the charge that negative emotions will rarely, if ever, 
be fitting—much less instrumentally valuable—because they’re too likely to generate false-positives 
and false-negatives: we regularly fear things like the murderer in the horror movie that pose no danger; 
and we routinely fail to fear things like handguns and climate change that do. Second, even when 
negative emotions are fitting (i.e., when they’re not systematically misfiring), they can still distort our 
understanding of our situations and so motivate us to act in problematic ways. Anger, for instance, 
can get us to lash out at others in ways that are disproportionate (e.g., the offense was minor) or 
misdirected (e.g., they were merely a bystander to a genuine offense).3 
Along both these dimensions, anxiety seems to be in big trouble. With regard to misfires, 
Woody Allen is a wonderful case in point—he not only finds occasion for anxiety everywhere but he’s a 
hopeless mess as a result. However, even if we just focus on fitting anxiety, there’s no shortage of 
examples of it leading to disaster. Consider, for instance, what we find in Scott Stossel’s recent memoir 
My Age of Anxiety (2013). He gets anxious whenever he needs to speak before a large group—a fitting 
response given the potential for a negative reaction from his audience. However, his anxiety about 
public speaking brings such intense cycles of dread, nausea, and sweating that he must resort to Xanax 
and vodka to prevent himself from running out on the talk he’s supposed to give. Hardly a picture of 
anxiety contributing to health and well-being—much less one’s career prospects. 
                                                 
3 Seneca’s concerns about anger’s value are, at least in part, driven by observations like these.  
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But while these examples of anxiety run amok provide a rhetorically powerful way to raise 
concerns about the fittingness and instrumental value of anxiety, we should pause to ask whether they 
really make for a convincing case. Are individuals who have anxiety disorders like Allen and Stossel 
really good examples of how anxiety generally functions, or merely anxiety when it happens to go awry? 
Notice as well that it’s not difficult to find examples of fitting and instrumentally valuable anxiety. 
Consider Henry Marsh, one of the world’s most accomplished neurosurgeon. Though he’s performed 
over 400 brain surgeries, these procedures still make him anxious. However, he doesn’t see his anxiety 
as unfitting or problematic. Rather, he sees it as the manifestation of his accumulated surgical expertise. 
For instance, when trying to figure out whether to remove more of a tumor—at the risk of damaging 
healthy brain tissue—he’s guided by his anxiety. As he explains, “you stop when you start getting more 
anxious. That’s experience” (Knausgaard 2015).  
Recognizing all this reveals that the real question is not whether fitting anxiety is helpful, but 
rather whether there’s anything interesting we can say about when and why it can be useful. This is 
obviously a huge empirical question—one that psychologist, cognitive scientists, and emotion 
researchers are only just starting to understand. But for the beginnings of an answer, we can turn to 
research on a common technique used in public health and safety advertisements. These ads make use 
of graphic images, audio, and text in order to elicit anxiety and related emotions (worry, unease, 
distress) in an effort to curb smoking, drunk driving, and other harmful behaviors. For our purposes, 
this research is important in several ways. First, because these campaigns present individuals with 
information and images about potential threats, the anxiety they trigger will (typically) be fitting. 
Moreover, the research on the effectiveness of these campaigns helps us understand the conditions 
under which fitting anxiety can bring (health, safety) benefits. Generally speaking, these ad campaigns 
are better able to reduce the targeted harmful behaviors when the anxiety they provoke (i) conveys 
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the sense that the viewer is vulnerable to being harmed by the risky behavior and (ii) instills the feeling 
that they can do something to avoid those harms (Lewis, Watson, Tay & White 2007; c.f., Brader 2006).  
Extending these findings to more general questions about (fitting) anxiety’s usefulness 
suggests that anxiety will be helpful on occasions where it doesn’t just make potential threats and 
challenges more salient, but also helps one identify potential solutions or otherwise leaves one feeling 
empowered. By contrast, anxiety is likely to bring trouble when it elicits feelings of vulnerability and 
undermines one’s sense of efficacy. Moreover, notice that these findings fit nicely with what we see in 
Stossel and Marsh. Stossel is an occasional public speaker with (by his own account) a track record of 
unfortunate performances. His history of flubbed talks thus leaves him feeling not just vulnerable, but 
also unable to prevent another embarrassing episode—hence all the vodka and Xanax (Stossel 2013). 
Marsh, by comparison, is an accomplished neurosurgeon with decades of training and experience. So 
while he both feels unease during a surgery and is well aware of the damage that a poor judgment on 
his part can bring, his anxiety doesn’t leave him feeling unnerved or distracted. Rather, he sees it as a 
corrective for potentially disastrous overconfidence (Marsh 2014). 
Stepping back, viewing the examples of Stossel and Marsh in light of the research on public 
safety campaigns suggests a negative emotion like anxiety is more useful to the extent that it’s 
experienced not just at the right time but also in the right way. That is, we don’t just want our anxiety to 
fit the situation, but to also be well-regulated—we want its intensity to be appropriately calibrated to the 
challenge at hand. Moreover, if we focus on the Marsh example, two further insights emerge. First, 
we see that the tendency to experience anxiety at the right time and in the right way isn’t just 
instrumentally beneficial, but also valuable in a deeper sense. Marsh’s anxiety doesn’t just help him be 
a more effective surgeon. It also reveals something important about his character: his anxiety 
demonstrates an admirable emotional attunement—a sensitivity to the surgical risks and uncertainty 
at hand. Second, Marsh’s remark that his anxiety is a product of his experience suggests that effective 
7 
 
emotion regulation is skill-like: it’s something we can get better at through practice and learning. In 
the next two sections, we’ll look more closely at these two ideas. Doing this will further enrich our 
understanding of the value that negative emotions can have.  
3. Anxiety, Anger, and Virtuous Character 
Let’s start with the idea that anxiety is more than just instrumentally valuable—in particular, the 
suggestion from above that anxiety is a component of virtuous character (i.e., that it has what 
philosophers call aretaic value). To do this, it will be helpful to say a little about virtue more generally. 
As standardly understood, virtues are excellences of character in the sense that they are comprised of 
integrated packages of beliefs, motivations, and feelings.4 The underlying idea here is that virtues must 
involve more than just occasions where one’s actions or habits happen to bring (morally) good 
outcomes. Rather, a virtue like benevolence is an excellence of character that has cognitive, conative, 
and affective dimensions. So, for example, instances of benevolence are not merely cases where one 
is prompted to help another in need. Rather, they are situations where the assistance one provides is 
undergirded by both the belief that the person needs help and a feeling of sympathy for her plight. 
The belief is necessary because we do not (typically) admire those who blindly manage to do good. 
The affective component is also necessary: to not give to someone in need from a feeling of sympathy 
(or, worse, to resent giving assistance) would be indicative of a deficient character—you would be 
emotionally out of tune with what’s happening.  
With this general picture of virtue in hand, we can turn to the distinctive moral concern that 
virtuous individuals display. Doing this will help draw out the deeper value that negative emotions like 
anxiety and anger can have. To begin, notice that virtuous individuals are persons who stand up for 
                                                 
4 While the claim that virtues are constituted by integrated combinations of beliefs, motivations, and feelings is contested 
by some, it is the received view about virtue. See, for instance, Aristotle 1998 and Annas 2011. David Hume (1975) and 
Kant (1996) are prominent dissenting voices (but on Kant, see Baxley 2010, chap. 4).  
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what’s right and good in the sense that they’ll defend what they see as valuable when it is in danger 
(Aristotle 1998, 96-8). Virtuous individuals are also sensitive to uncertainty in the sense that they appreciate 
the limits of their knowledge and the extent of their fallibility (e.g., Stohr 2003). Admirable character 
traits like these form the core of the virtue I’m calling “moral concern.”5  
Now since moral concern is a virtue, its characteristic behaviors—namely, to defend what’s 
valuable and to be sensitive to uncertainty—are (as we saw above) undergirded by a distinctive 
combination of beliefs, motivations, and feelings. It’s here that anxiety and anger enter the picture. 
They are the emotions that comprise the feeling dimension of moral concern. To flesh this out, first 
consider anger. As we saw in §1, anger has a distinctive phenomenology and functional role: it’s a 
response to affronts and slights that brings negatively valenced feelings and a motivational tendency 
to defend oneself, one’s interests, or one’s standing. So we have a nice fit: our understanding of anger 
meshes with the dimension of moral concern that involves the defense of what one sees as valuable. 
To further draw out this fit, consider a person who discovers that she has been lied to by someone 
she trusts, but who isn’t at all angry about it. An individuals like this strikes us not just as odd, but 
deficient—she fails to appreciate the violation of her moral worth that has occurred. Moreover, 
recognizing anger as a constitutive feature of the defense-dimension of moral concern explains our 
reactions to an unperturbed individual like this. Anger not only helps one stand up for oneself as an 
individual who has value and merits respect; it is also an expression of the moral significance that one 
takes oneself to have. To not be angry in the face of betrayal is to evince a lack of emotional and 
evaluative attunement to what matters.  
We find something similar for anxiety—especially in its epistemically-oriented form (§1). It is, 
as we’ve seen, an emotion that’s concerned with uncertainty and that prompts a combination of 
                                                 
5 Here I’m using “moral” in the broad sense typical of virtue theory: it refers not just to (e.g.) right and wrong behavior 
but to the more encompassing “practical wisdom” that virtuous individuals display.  
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caution and inquiry (information gathering, deliberation, reflection, etc.). Thus, anxiety of this sort fits 
nicely with the dimension of moral concern that involves a sensitivity and responsiveness to the 
possibility that one’s choice might be mistaken. To draw this out, consider some difficult moral 
decisions. (i) It’s becoming hard for you to care for your Alzheimer’s-stricken mother. Her doctors 
have suggested it’s time to put her in a nursing home, but you know she’s terrified of those places. 
What should do you do? (ii) Your colleague has again been mistreated by your mutual boss. Should 
you stand up for her even though you know it will come at a (significant) cost to your career? (iii) 
You’re a senior professor and have a talented graduate student looking for a job. You’ve written her 
a very strong recommendation. But should you do more—say, contact departments where she’s 
applying to try and give them a nudge? Or would that be to take advantage of the system?  
In situations like these, you face a decision that involves complex and potentially competing 
considerations. Worse, these cases are ones where the existing (moral, professional) norms and your 
own prior experiences provide insufficient guidance about what to do. To be unfazed—to not feel 
uneasy or uncomfortable about decisions like these—strikes us not just as odd, but deficient. Such an 
individual would be troublingly disconnected from the significance and complexity of her choice. 
Seeing anxiety as constitutive of a virtuous moral concern helps explain this. Anxiety doesn’t just bring 
a sensitivity to the problematic uncertainty we find in cases like these; it is also an expression of one’s 
appreciation of the complexity of the decision at hand. It evinces one’s emotional and evaluative 
attunement. 
If these reflections are on point, they suggest not just that anxiety and anger are essential 
elements of moral concern, but that they are valuable because of what they say about one’s emotional 
attunement. Importantly, the value here isn’t (merely) instrumental in nature. Rather, it’s value 
grounded in the contribution these emotions make to one’s character: to have the virtue of moral 
10 
 
concern is to be a person who feels angry when what they care about is threatened and who feels 
anxious in the face of a difficult or novel choice.  
But one might be skeptical that anxiety (or anger) is aretaically valuable—that it’s important 
beyond the instrumental benefits it brings. To give this worry more substance, consider the following 
possibility. Suppose you could take a pill—a new version of Xanax, say—that would bring the 
instrumental benefits associated with anxiety (e.g., caution and reflection) but without the felt 
unpleasantness and unease. If you had such a pill, would you take it? If you answer yes, it suggests you 
think there’s nothing aretaically valuable in anxiety. It’s only valuable in virtue of the moral concern it 
helps bring about.  
For anyone who has battled with anxiety, I suspect the pill has appeal. But to draw out that 
there’s something amiss in this thought, we should consider a case where although anxiety in neither 
fitting nor instrumentally beneficial, we nonetheless deem it valuable. Such a case, after all, would be 
an example of a situation where anxiety has non-instrumental value. So consider again your 
Alzheimer’s-stricken mother. Her disease has now run its course and, tragically, each day only brings 
her more pain and suffering. You promised her that when this moment came, you would give her a 
euthanizing dose of morphine. So you must now decide whether to keep that promise. You are 
anxious—is this the right thing to do?—and, as a result, think hard about both your promise and your 
mother’s condition.6 After much reflection, you conclude that you ought to do what you promised. 
And you do. But days later, you’re still anxious. Though you keep rethinking your decision, you keep 
coming to the same conclusion: it was the right thing to do. Yet your anxiety about the choice remains.  
What can we say about your anxiety? First, given that it’s anxiety about a difficult decision that 
prompts reflection and reassessment, we can see that we are dealing with the epistemically-oriented 
                                                 
6 Clearly, in a situation like this, anxiety is unlikely to be the only emotion you feel. Anger, sadness, and frustration are 
other likely possibilities. Here I focus just on anxiety to help draw out the aretaic dimension of its value. 
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form of anxiety. This, in turn, helps us understand when your anxiety is (un)fitting. More specifically, 
your anxiety is clearly fitting as you contemplate whether to keep the promise: you face a difficult choice 
and have reason to reflect and reassess. However, it’s less clear—doubtful even—that your anxiety 
remains fitting after you have administered the morphine: since you no longer face a hard choice and 
since the choice you made cannot be reversed, you have no reason to revisit or reassess it. Moreover, 
your post-decision anxiety doesn’t just seem unfitting, it also seems to lack instrumental value: not only 
is your lingering anxiety unpleasant, but the reflection it prompts does nothing to change either your 
conclusion or enrich your understanding of what was at stake—each new round of anxiety-induced 
reflection leads you back to the same considerations and the same conclusion.  
However, your persisting anxiety—though unfitting and void of instrumental value—still 
reflects well on you. It is the manifestation of your admirable sensitivity to the difficult choice you faced 
(c.f., Williams 1976). We’d find someone who had no lingering unease in a situation like yours 
disconcerting; a quick transition back to an anxiety-free demeanor would prompt worries about their 
character. It would suggest they hadn’t really appreciated the gravity of their choice. But notice what 
this means: it means we are again seeing that anxiety has aretaic value—it is an integral part of what 
we admire about you and the concern you demonstrate in this awful situation.  
Stepping back, this case reveals that the aretaic value of anxiety is independent of its fittingness 
or instrumental contributions. Anxiety is important not just because of the benefits it can bring, but 
also because of what it says about the character of the individual who experiences it. Moreover, given 
that negative emotions like anxiety (and anger) are central to human agency, they are features of our 
(moral) psychology that, if eliminated by popping some special pill, would come at real cost to how 
we understand and assess ourselves and others. So while the Xanax objection might have initially 
seemed to cause trouble for our claims about the aretaic value of anxiety, its plausibility fades on closer 
examination. 
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4. Cultivating More Valuable Anxiety 
Turn now to the second suggestion that emerged from our discussion of Henry Marsh—namely, that 
learning to effectively regulate negative emotions like anxiety is much like developing a skill: it’s 
something we can get better at through learning and experience. More specifically, if emotions are 
forms of evaluative awareness whereby we see (aspects of) our situation in an evaluatively-loaded 
manner (§1), then becoming better emotionally attuned will involve developing a better understanding 
of what sorts of features merit a given response. This thought has been taken up by philosophers, 
especially those working in the Aristotelian tradition. Nancy Sherman, for instance, explains that 
“[c]ultivating the dispositional capacities to feel fear, anger, goodwill, compassion, or pity 
appropriately will be bound up with learning how to discern the circumstances that warrant these 
responses” (1989, 167; also Annas 2011). And she argues that we develop such an understanding via 
a combination of our individual experiences and our interactions with others who help us recognize 
the particular features of a situation that make a given emotion (in)appropriate. 
While these observations about how to cultivate emotions have a breezy plausibility to them, 
one might reasonably wonder whether they’re correct: can we really cultivate our emotional capacities 
in the same way that we develop a skill? On this front, research on cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) 
may offer some answers. CBT is used to treat individuals with (e.g.) severe anxiety, phobias, and 
depression. Its driving premise is that these emotional disorders are sustained by cognitive factors 
(e.g., minimizing the positive aspects of a situation, catastrophizing, overgeneralizing) and so can be 
effectively treated by helping individuals develop coping skills that allow them to both better identify 
situations that trigger the problematic emotional response, and engage coping strategies that can help 
correct the distorting thoughts/attitudes.  
In the present context, CBT is interesting for two reasons. First, the techniques at the heart of 
CBT are of the very sort that Aristotelians like Sherman point to as the core tools for effective emotion 
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cultivation—namely, working with others to better understand when and why an emotional response 
is (in)appropriate. Thus, it provides us with a concrete model for thinking about how best to regulate 
and cultivate emotions. Second, research indicates that CBT is quite effective. For instance, a recent 
meta-analysis found “strong support for the efficacy of CBT” as a treatment for anxiety disorders 
(Hofmann & Smits 2008). To be clear, the suggestion here is not that we should sign ourselves and 
our children up for psychiatry appointments! Rather, the point is that research on CBT’s effectiveness 
suggests that the techniques it emphasizes provide support and substance to the Aristotelian 
suggestion that cultivating emotions is much like developing a skill.   
5. Conclusion 
Recognizing the essential place that negative emotions have in our understanding of human agency 
helps us see what is wrong with Kant’s claims about the incompatibility of virtue and negative emotion. 
Recall that on Kant’s picture, virtue is understood in terms of rational self-control: virtue is “the moral 
strength of a human being’s will in fulfilling his duty” (1996, 533) and thus the virtuous agent is one 
for whom “reason holds the reins of government in its own hands” (536). So understood, the problem 
with feeling negative emotions is that it represents a failure of self-control: emotion—not reason—
determines one’s behavior. But what Kant seems to have missed is the essential role that negative 
emotions like anxiety play in promoting self-control. Recall the Marsh example. The anxiety he 
experiences in surgery doesn’t represent a failure of self-control, but rather the manifestation of it. It’s 
because he feels anxious and it’s because this anxiety is unpleasant, that it can bring the focus and 
caution that it does. That gets missed, however, if one focuses—as Kant (and Seneca) seems to—on 
cases where anxiety, anger, or other negative emotions manifest in extreme or clinical forms. But once 
we set these atypical cases aside, we can see the value—instrumental and aretaic—that negative 
emotions can have.  
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